



# TYCHE

Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte  
Papyrologie und Epigraphik

Herausgegeben von

Gerhard Dobesch, Bernhard Palme  
Peter Siewert und Ekkehard Weber

Band 19, 2004

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WOLZHAUSEN



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**H O L Z H A U S E N**

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Tafeln 1–9

JACEK RZEPKA

## Philip II of Macedon and ‘The Garrison in Naupactus’

A Re-Interpretation of Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 235

Early relations between Macedonia and the Aetolian Confederacy, unlike their contacts in the Hellenistic Age, have not been often subjected to historical investigation. In spite — or rather because — of this relative shortage of modern studies historical constructs do not agree in details. Historians dealing with a rapid growth of Macedonia during the reign of Philip II admit that Aetolia belonged to his closest allies even in the last years of the king’s reign. This friendly attitude is commonly believed to find proof in transferring Naupactus from the Achaean Confederacy to the Aetolians with help from Philip II after the battle of Chaeronea. This *consensus*<sup>1</sup>, however, was disturbed by an unconventional historical reconstruction presented by A. B. Bosworth<sup>2</sup>. The sequence of events as presented by Bosworth was not unquestionably accepted, but still demands discussion since the person behind it undoubtedly belongs to the most influential recent historians of Alexander the Great<sup>3</sup>. A test case used by Bosworth to

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All three-figure dates in this article are B.C. unless otherwise indicated.

It is my pleasant duty to thank my teacher Prof. Włodzimierz Lengauer of Warsaw University as well as Professors Benedetto Bravo of Warsaw and Wolfgang Schuller of Constance who — as the examiners — read this text in its earlier form of excursion within my doctoral dissertation (*The Constituent Poleis in face of the Federal Government in the Hellenistic Aetolian League*, Warszawa 2001) for their comments to this reconstruction and all generous help. My special thanks shall go to Dr Robin Crellin, who was kind to read and improve my English text. It is needless to say that I am sole responsible for errors that remain.

For the first time, some of ideas advocated here were published in much more comprised form as a short excursion in my earlier article in Polish; see J. Rzepka, *Poleis członkowskie w polityce zagranicznej Związku Etolskiego w okresie hellenistycznym*, *Przegląd Historyczny* 91 (2000) 157–180 (on 159–162).

<sup>1</sup> See below, n. 7.

<sup>2</sup> A. B. Bosworth, *Early Relations between Aetolia and Macedon*, *AJAH* 1 (1976) 164–181; reaffirmed in A. B. Bosworth, *Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander I*, Oxford 1980, 92. A temporary disbandment of the Aetolian Confederacy was concluded from Arrian’s text by B. Niese, *Die Geschichte der griechischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea I*, Gotha 1893, 58; A. Schäfer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit II*, Leipzig 1886, 559; H. Pomtow, *Fasti Delphici*, *Neue Jahrb.* 43 (1897) 748. Ernst Kirsten in a short, yet extremely instructive encyclopedic article considered that the Aetolian Confederacy had continued to exist, but „getrennte Diplomatie κατὰ ἔθνη“, “divided diplomacy on tribal basis” had been possible in some cases, see E. Kirsten, *Aetolia*, *Kleiner Pauly* 1 (1964) 207.

<sup>3</sup> See esp.: A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire. The Reign of Alexander the Great*, Cambridge 1988, 188 and 223; where he reiterates his interpretation. There are few, but —

enlighten the real nature of Aetolian — Macedonian relations in the 330s is the fate of Naupactus during the last years of Philip II<sup>4</sup>. His main result is that Philip II had dissolved the Aetolian Confederacy after the Chaeronea campaign. Bosworth alleges that the Aetolian Confederacy was temporarily disbanded, based on a passage in Arrian's *Anabasis of Alexander* (1, 10, 2), according to which in 335 the Aetolians sent to Alexander the Great "their tribal embassies" (Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ πρεσβείας σφῶν κατὰ ἔθνη πέμψαντες). This information is often compared with a Thucydidean account of Aetolian operations led by Demosthenes in 426. The Aetolians threatened by an invading army resolved to send envoys to Corinth and Sparta (Thuc. 3, 100, 1). The embassy consisted of three envoys Tolophos of the subtribe *Ophioneis*, Boriades of *Eurytanes* and Teisandros of *Apodotoi*. Each of the ambassadors represented one part (μέρος) of the Aetolian ἔθνος which were described by Thucydides some chapters earlier (Thuc. 3, 94–95). Most scholars interpreted both reports as evidence that Aetolians in 426 and 335 were a kind of loose tribal state (ein Stammesstaat). In such a form of polity foreign affairs would have belonged to the central government,

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at the same time — influential scholars, who accepted Bosworth's conclusions; e.g. G. Wirth, *Philipp II. Geschichte Makedoniens I*, Stuttgart 1985, 137 (similarly in the commentary on Greek-German edition of Arrian, *Anabasis. Der Alexanderzug. Indische Geschichte*, edited by G. Wirth and O. Hinüber, München 1985, in com. ad loc. states that plural *presbeiai* were sent by Aetolians according to the wish of Alexander III; G. Wirth, *Hyperides, Lykurg und die ἀντονομία der Athener. Ein Versuch zum Verständnis einiger Reden der Alexanderzeit* (SAWW 666), Wien 1999, 111 n. 366 confirmed Bosworth's proposal, while makes a question to the First Speech of Hyperides (1, 18, 14ff.): „Erwähnt sind Achaier, Arkader und Boioter (doch bleibt für letztere m.E. die Lesung zweifelhaft). Die Art der Anreihung (τε καὶ ... καὶ) läßt vermuten, daß in der folgenden Lücke noch andere Stammesbünde genannt werden. Zu verwundern ist indes, daß von einer Absicht der Auflösung der Aitolier auch sonst nichts erwähnt wird“. Among other followers of Bosworth one can mention S. Hornblower, *The Greek World 479–323*, London 1983, 259; L. Marinovič, *Sparta vremena Agisa III*, in: L. M. Gluskina (ed.), *Antičnaja Grecija II*, Moskva 1983, 272–273; D. Mendels, *Aetolia 331–301 B.C. Frustration, Political Power and Survival*, *Historia* 33 (1984) 129–180, esp. 132; S. Bomméje, *Aeolis in Aetolia. Thuc. III 102, 5 and the origins of the Aetolian ethnos*, *Historia* 37 (1988) 297–316, esp. 310 n. 46; I. L. Merker, *The Achaians in Naupaktos and Kalydon in the fourth century*, *Hesperia* 58 (1989) 303–311; M. Arnush, *The Archonship of Sarpadon at Delphi*, *ZPE* 105 (1995) 95–104 (on p. 99: "the promise of Naupaktos, a promise which apparently never materialized").

<sup>4</sup> One cannot take seriously a statement of Diodorus that Epameinondas liberated Naupactus from the Achaean Confederacy; Diod. 15, 75, 2: Ἐπαμεινώνδας δ' ὁ Θηβαῖος μετὰ δυνάμεως ἐμβαλὼν εἰς Πελοπόννησον τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ τινὰς ἄλλας πόλεις προσηγάγετο, Δύμην δὲ καὶ Ναύπακτον καὶ Καλυδῶνα φρουρουμένην ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν ἠλευθέρωσεν ("Epameinondas, the Theban, entered the Peloponnese with an army, won over the Achaeans and some cities besides and liberated Dyme, Naupactus and Calydon, which were held by a garrison of the Achaeans"; transl. by C. L. Sherman in LCL edition of Diodorus). Most likely, this was in an original plan of Epaminondas, but his only success remained the liberation of Calydon.



namely: primary assembly, customary rights and external interests of constituent parts — tribes (μέρη - ἔθνη) were, however, to be respected<sup>5</sup>.

According to Bosworth, the plural form (*presbeiai*) used by Arrian in *Anabasis* 1, 10, 2 resulted from a simple fact that there were many states in Aetolia in the very beginning of the reign of Alexander the Great. His starting point is a discord between an opinion that Aetolians belonged to Greek peoples, who profited much from the settlement of Philip II with Greek states, and the fact that Aetolians were a leading power among the fiercest enemies of Macedon in the end of Alexander's reign. Their strongly anti-Macedonian tendency led them to a participation in the Lamian War. Bosworth believes that Philip II disbanded the Aetolian Confederacy because of its disloyalty towards the king, after — in spite of earlier promises — he had refused to transfer Naupactus to them. Bosworth pretends to choose here the source version based on Theopompus (*FGrHist* 115 F 235) and rejects the information of Strabo the Geographer (9, 4, 7) saying that Philip passed judgement transferring Naupactus to the Aetolians in the time of battle of Chaeronea<sup>6</sup>.

The fragment of Theopompus was transmitted by two later sources. One is *Lexicon of Proverbs* by Zenobius, another *Liber Suda*. Zenobius' proverb about *garrison in Naupactus* (6, 33) reads: φρουρησαι ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ· Φιλίππου Ναύπακτον ἐλόντος Ἀχαιοὶ τοὺς φρουροὺς ἀπέσφαξαν καὶ Πausανίαν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς φρουρᾶς ἀπέκτειναν, ὡς φησι Θεόπομπος: "to serve in the Naupactus garrison: When Philip had captured Naupactus, Achaeans murdered the soldiers of the garrison and killed Pausanias, the garrison's commandant, as Theopompus says". The parallel entry in *Liber Suda* says: Φρουρήσεις ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ· τοῖς Ναύπακτον φρουροῦσιν ὀλίγου μισθοῦ διδομένου, τῶν δ' ἐπιτηδείων πολλοῦ πιπρασκομένων, τὴν παροιμίαν γενέσθαι. ἐνιοὶ δέ, ὅτι Φίλιππος ἐλὼν Ναύπακτον Ἀχαιῶν γνώμη τοὺς φρουροὺς αὐτῆς ἀπέκτεινε πάντας. ἱστορεῖ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ Θεόπομπος ἐν δευτέρῳ:

<sup>5</sup> G. Busolt, H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde II*, München 1926, 1508; M. Sordi, *Die Anfänge des Aitolischen Koinon*, in: F. Gschnitzer (ed.), *Zur griechischen Staatskunde*, Darmstadt 1966, 343–374, esp. 356 and 362 (originally edited in Italian as *Le origini del koinon etolico*, *Acme* 6 [1953] 419–445), rejected a deliberate constitutional transformation *uno actu*; J. A. O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, Oxford 1968, 79. 156; A. Giovannini, *Untersuchungen über die Natur und Anfänge der bundesstaatlichen Sympolitie in Griechenland*, Göttingen 1971, 60. The theory of one-time reform of the Aetolian state was supported by Peter Funke (*Polisgenese und Urbanisierung in Aitolien im 5. und 4. Jh. v. Chr.*, in: M. H. Hansen [ed.], *The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community* [Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre 4], Copenhagen, 1997, 151–152, with a date in the fifth century proposed).

<sup>6</sup> Bosworth, *Early Relations* (n. 2) 169: "Strabo merely states that Philip adjudged the city to the Aetolians and does not imply that he actually captured the city and surrendered it to them". Such explanation has no sense, Strabo perfectly knew, what he was to write and why he wrote it — he certainly had a source informing that Naupactus had belonged to the Aetolians, after Philip II had transferred the polis to them. Bosworth does not take into account an argument of W. Hohmann, *Aitolien und die Aitoler bis zum lamischen Kriege*, Halle 1908, 34–35, that Philip transferred (and adjudged) Naupactus to the Aetolians as the *hegemon* of the Hellenic League. Yet, if Hohmann's construct had been true, one would have still needed a conjecture in the fragments of Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 235.

“you will serve in the Naupactus garrison: Given that those garrisoning Naupactus received low pay whereas they had to buy high-priced necessities, a proverb has arisen. Others say that Philip after he had captured Naupactus killed all its garrison-troops on a decision of the Achaeans. Thus recounts also Theopompus in the second book”. One tried to agree both lexicographic quotations with the version of Strabo. Finally, a brutal conjecture by Arnold Schäfer has been accepted for a long time. The German philologist and historian pretended to find a pure text of Theopompus. The text according to him may have run as follows: Φίλιππος ἐλὼν Ναύπακτον Ἀχαιῶν τοὺς φρουροὺς αὐτῆς ἀπέκτεινε: “Philip, when he had captured Naupactus from the Achaeans, killed soldiers of the garrison”<sup>7</sup>.

The account of Strabo finds confirmation in words of Demosthenes in the Third Philippic (Dem. 9, 34). The Athenian orator states there that Philip already in 342 promised to transfer Naupactus to the Aetolians<sup>8</sup>. Yet, for Bosworth, there is little value in this ‘news’ from the past.

As Bosworth assumes, Philip had changed his mind and did not surrender the city to the Aetolians after the Chaeronean victory. The disgruntled Aetolians captured Nau-

<sup>7</sup> Schäfer, *Demosthenes* (n. 2) 559 — following own contribution (A. Schäfer, *Zu den Fragmenten von Theopompos*, *Neue Jahrb.* 89 [1859] 483, Bosworth is surely right, there is no need of such textual improvements. Many later students overlooked the problem; W. K. Pritchett omitted the Naupactus’ massacre in his catalogue of slaughters done by Greek states in captured poleis [W. K. Pritchett, *Greek State at War V*, Berkeley 1991, 218–219]). Some others accept the conjecture of Schäfer and, when speaking about transferring Naupactus to the Aetolians, they refer to Theopompus, *FGrHist* 115 F 235 without any further comment; cf. F. R. Wüst, *Philipp II. von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren von 346 bis 338*, München 1938, 164; C. Roebuck, *The Settlement of Philip II with the Greek States in 338 B.C.*, CPh 43 (1948) 77; J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and the Macedonian Imperialism*, London 1976, 280; G. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon*, London 1976, 168; J. B. Scholten, *The Politics of Plunder*, Berkeley 2000, 13–15 collects premises for the Aetolian conquest of Naupactus, but does not pay duly attention to Theopompus’ fragment. The problem has been meticulously noticed by N. G. L. Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, London 1994, 148, who, while referring to Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 235, stated that the monarch had surrendered the city to the Aetolians. He comments that of two versions of Theopompus’ fragment “the text of Zenobius is to be preferred”. Hammond does not say it clearly, but considers, as seems, that Achaeans killed their own garrison after the loss of Naupactus. Hammond suspects that the garrison staff was charged with treason. It is the best proposal of conforming Strabo and Theopompus. Hammond considers only the version of Suda to be corrupted. As I am going to show, both variants of Theopompus’ text could match with the statement by Strabo.

<sup>8</sup> The relevant passage is: οὐ μόνον δ’ ἐφ’ οἷς ἡ Ἑλλάς ὑβρίζεται ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, οὐδεὶς ἀμύνεται, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὑπὲρ ὧν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἀδικεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ-σχατόν ἐστιν. οὐ Κορινθίων ἐπ’ Ἀμβρακίαν ἐλήλυθε καὶ Λευκάδα; οὐκ Ἀχαιῶν Ναύπακτον ὁμώμοκεν Αἰτωλοῖς παραδώσειν; οὐχὶ Θηβαίων Ἐχίνον ἀφήρηται, καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ Βυζαντίους πορεύεται συμμάχους ὄντας. (“And it is not only his outrages on Greece that go unavenged, but even the wrongs which each suffer separately. For nothing can go beyond that. Are not the Corinthians hit by his invasion of Ambracia and Leucas? Are not the Achaeans by his promise to transfer Naupactus to the Aetolians? Are not the Thebans by his theft of Echinus? And is he not marching even now against his allies the Byzantines?”).

pactus against the will of Philip, when the monarch was settling matters on Peloponnese. The conquerors of Naupactus were cruelly punished whether by the king or by the Achaeans. Bosworth admits that Aetolians were allies of Philip at Chaeronea, but the Macedonian king was to forget his promise after the victory and re-assured the Achaean dominance on the northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth. Bosworth argues that the Aetolian Confederacy could not seem a sure and stable ally to the Macedon<sup>9</sup>. On the other hand, continuing existence of the Achaean Confederacy until the reign of Alexander the Great is for Bosworth proof of Philip's goodwill towards the Achaeans<sup>10</sup>. The Australian scholar suggests that the Aetolians in addition to the massacre of their garrison in Naupactus experienced enforced disbanding of their Confederacy. Bosworth finds Agraioi, a supposed Aetolian tribe, among states, which joined the Hellenic Alliance of Philip II (Tod, *GHI* II 177 = *StV* III 403). Yet, in the Classical period (and surely in the fifth century) Agraioi were not an Aetolian tribe, i.e. they did not belong to the Confederacy. They were rather east-oriented and, therefore, connected with Thessaly<sup>11</sup>. We can say with certainty that Agraioi were a part of the Aetolian Confederacy first in the Hellenistic Age.

A slightly different reconstruction, but built on the same assumptions as that of Bosworth, was presented recently by John D. Grainger. His attitude towards Aetolians is — to be true — too enthusiastic, and this very disposition influenced the story told by the last historian of the Aetolian people. Against evident indications of sources, Grainger disbelieves in the Aetolian pressure to the East<sup>12</sup>. His very *amour* towards

<sup>9</sup> Bosworth, *Early Relations* (n. 2) 172.

<sup>10</sup> There appears striking inconsequence in Bosworth's interpretation of events. The fact that the Aetolian Confederacy took part in anti-Macedonian movement in Greece in 335 and in the Lamian War is, according to him, a proof they were *inveterate enemies* of Macedon. Just opposite in the case of the Achaeans, they took part in the Agian War (331/330), but: "There is no sign of inveterate hostility towards Macedon"; see: Bosworth, *Early Relations* (n. 2) 172.

<sup>11</sup> C. Antonetti, *Agraioi et Agrioi. Montagnards et bergers: un prototype diachronique du sauvagerie*, *DHA* 13 (1987), 199–236; *eadem*, *Le popolazioni settentrionali dell' Etolia: difficoltà di localizzazione e problema dei limiti territoriali, alla luce della documentazione epigrafica*, in *Actes du colloque internationale sur l'Illyrie méridionale et l'Epire dans l'Antiquité*, Clermont-Ferrand 1987, 95–113.

<sup>12</sup> J. D. Grainger, *The League of the Aitolians*, Leiden 1999, 41. Grainger, however, often goes too far in whitening Aetolians and ascribing them a kind of childlike innocence. So on page 42, we can find a comment on an alliance between Aetolia and Macedonia: "The Aitolians now (i.e. in 340'ies — J. R.) noticed that they were only uncommitted people in central Greece in the great crisis". The pro-Aetolian tendency of Grainger becomes apparent elsewhere, especially in his analysis of the Aetolian piracy. He consequently diminishes its significance. Two quotations from page 19 could be particularly instructive: "Therefore if a state, such as Aitolia, concluded large numbers of these (i.e. treaties of *asylia* — J. R.) agreements, it follows that piracy was being discouraged by that state". "If piracy by Aitolians existed, it was small scale and private, like that conducted by every other ancient (and medieval) Mediterranean people with a coastline". Grainger omits here important studies, which made clear that an impressive number of *asylia* covenants had reflected need of such devices, and also, indirectly, existence of brigandage. The modern standard studies of the custom of *asylan* in Greece (by Ph. Gauthier, *Symbola. Les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques*, Nancy 1972, and principally by B. Bravo, *Sulan. Représailles et*

Aetolians pushed him to modify Bosworth's sequence of events. An even more hazardous play with the sources resulted: Strabo (9, 4, 7) informs that Philip awarded Naupactus to the Aetolians — according to Grainger this implies arbitration and peaceful transferring of the city from the Achaeans to the Aetolians after Chaeronea<sup>13</sup>. Only one year after, in 337, Philip would have noticed that the Achaeans were for him a more valuable ally than the Aetolians. Therefore, the King of the Macedonians would have changed the sentence, this time in favour of the Achaeans. One can note that such a mistake in choosing a partner was rather uncommon for a skilled and shrewd politician such as Philip was, and I doubt, he could have been mistaken so much. When the Aetolians were unwilling to leave Naupactus, Grainger continues: "In 337 Philip and the Achaeans together attacked Naupactus. Its Aetolian garrison resisted, and when the city was taken, the soldiers were put to the sword, including Pausanias, its commander"<sup>14</sup>. Grainger's reconstruction of events, however, also demands conjectures in text given by both sources transmitting the proverb uttered by Theopompus.

In my opinion the solution by Bosworth was built on misunderstanding of the genre of sources, which transmitted to us the text of Theopompus *FGHist* 115 F 235. So *Suda* as Zenobius were intended to explain something, what was ill understood already in Late Antiquity or Byzantine Time (as it is a normal task of any encyclopaedia or lexicon). In our particular case, both sources tried to explain an ill-understood proverb. One can ask why the "garrison in Naupactus" became a proverbial expression, since hundreds of garrisons were slain over the wars between Greeks. I would like to show, there is no need of conjecture in both texts given by lexicons and I hope to show even more: that the tradition tracing back to Theopompus is not contradictory to the information provided by Strabo and Demosthenes. As I think, the Naupactian massacre became an idiomatic expression, then proverb, because it was not a typical slaughter in a surrendered city. It became famous because Philip killed the Achaean garrison with Achaean hands. After the victory at Chaeronea (the victory over the Achaeans, too), Philip II started to settle matters in Greece<sup>15</sup>. The Achaean forces were defeated at Chaeronea and the Achaeans made an agreement with Philip (Aelian, var. hist 6, 1). We do know, however, nothing about spirits in Achaea and especially in Naupactus itself. It is possible that Achaeans living in Naupactus did not hurry to surrender to the king. We can be positive that the Achaean residents remembered the

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*justice privée contre les étrangers dans les cités grecques*, ASNP 10 (1981) 675–987) are absent from Grainger's dossier of recent works on the ancient Greek seizure custom.

<sup>13</sup> Grainger, *The League of the Aitolians* (n. 12) 42–43.

<sup>14</sup> Grainger, *The League of the Aitolians* (n. 12) 47.

<sup>15</sup> We have no clear accounts giving the sequence of events; the majority of students date conquering of Naupactus before battle of Chaeronea, this is the chronology proposed by Schäfer. It is possible, only if one accepts his conjecture (see above). Very few scholars, who mention the Naupactus episode, follow him: e.g. K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* IV (1), Berlin 1927 (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) 50; N. G. L. Hammond, G. T. Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, II, Oxford 1979, 594. Cf. Hohmann, *Aitolien* (n. 6) 34–36 and W. Oldfather, *Lokris*, RE 13, 1 (1926) 1213–1214, both properly arguing that the capture of Naupactus must have been later to the Chaeronea campaign.

promise, which Philip had given to the Aetolians a few years before. Moreover, when the king with his army appeared before the walls of Naupactus, they were not eager to capitulate<sup>16</sup>. Their resistance surely was unpleasant to the monarch, especially if the Achaean army at Chaeronea entered into the obligation to surrender Naupactus as a condition of the armistice. When Philip captured the city, he punished the Achaeans in a perfidious way: the Achaeans were obliged to impose a death penalty on all the members of garrison and their commandant. The garrison in Naupactus was charged with treason not because it surrendered the polis to the Philip and the Aetolians. The proper reason of accusation was resistance of the garrison against the Macedonian king, a deed equal to the refusal to accept a decision passed by the Achaean federal government, namely, its obligation to surrender Naupactus. One should agree with Bosworth on one thing: it does not matter, who was personally responsible for the massacre. It is impossible to reproduce the sequence of events: we do not know, whether Philip II conquered Naupactus after or before the Achaeans decreed the death sentence for their co-citizens. The chapter from *Historical Miscellany* by Aelian mentioned above (var. hist. 6, 1) tells that Philip II broke agreements with defeated states and dealt with them "illegally and unjustly" (*ekdika and paranoma*)<sup>17</sup>. Considered the character of the work of Aelian, being a compilation of anecdotes, I think that he alluded to real events rather than longer historical processes. The slaughter of the Achaean garrison in Naupactus on the 'will' of the Achaean central government corresponds well with such unjust and illegal managing in Greek affairs. One can say with certainty that this event had to become famous in all Greece. A way from the tragic and ironical fame to the equally ironical proverbial use must have not been too long. The fate, which Philip prepared for the Achaeans can explain their passivity in the years immediately after Chaeronea, they had to be deeply threatened by such a perfidious slaughter and had to fear the next crippling losses. Some centuries later Pausanias, the author of the guide, wrote in a short survey of Achaean history: "They say they did not march out into Thessaly to what is called the Lamian War, for they had not yet recovered from the reverse in Boeotia"<sup>18</sup>. In fact, the Achaeans decided to take part in

<sup>16</sup> The Achaeans had lived in Naupactus over two generations. With certainty, a greater part of them had no real property in native Achaea. The Achaeans of Naupactus surely had employed all possible methods to avoid beggars' fate in homeland Achaea, even if it had meant hopeless resistance to Philip and the rest of the Achaeans.

<sup>17</sup> Ἐπεὶ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην ἐνίκησεν ὁ Φίλιππος, ἐπὶ τῷπραχθέντι αὐτὸς τε ἦρτο καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες πάντες. οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνας δεινῶς αὐτὸν κατέπηξαν, καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κατὰ πόλεις ἐνεχείρισαν αὐτῷ φέροντες. καὶ τοῦτό γε ἔδρασαν Θηβαῖοι καὶ Μεγαρεῖς καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Ἡλεῖοι καὶ Εὐβοεῖς καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀκτῇ πάντες. οὐ μὴν ἐφύλαξε τὰς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁμολογίας ὁ Φίλιππος, ἀλλ' ἐδουλώσατο πάντας, ἐκδικὰ καὶ παράνομα δρῶν ("When Philip won the battle of Chaeronea he was buoyed by his achievement, as were all the Macedonians. The Greeks were very frightened of him, and their cities surrendered individually; this was the decision of Thebes, Megara, Corinth, the Achaeans, Elis, Euboea and the whole of Acte. But Philip did not respect the agreements he made with them, and enslaved them all unjustly and illegally", transl. by N. G. Wilson in the LCL edition of *Historical Miscellany* by Aelian).

<sup>18</sup> Paus. 7, 6, 5: πολέμων δὲ τῶν πολεμηθέντων ὕστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἑλλήσι κοινῶ τοῦ μὲν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ Φιλίππου τε ἐναντία καὶ Μακεδόνων οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ μετέσχον, ἐς

the Agian War in 331/330 — some years before the Lamian War, but it does not matter here. The most important is that the Achaeans considered the Chaeronea war as the episode which broke down their power. It is obvious that Chaeronea losses and Naupactus harms could be reported together as consequences of the ‘defeat in Boeotia’. One must realize that the Achaean contingent in the battle of Chaeronea was not numerous enough to explain the sudden diminution of the Achaean power<sup>19</sup>. We can also assume that such bitter experience as the Naupactus incident had to destroy mutual confidence in Achaean society and could help in a later disbandment of the Achaean Confederacy.

Bosworth omits from his dossier the fact that once in the period after a Macedonian take-over of control over Delphi, certainly after ca. 338 the Delphians gave the Aetolian Confederacy a privilege of *promanteia* (SEG 17.228 = FD III 4.399)<sup>20</sup>. Recently Michael Arnush claimed to give new strength to the argument of Bosworth, while attempting to explain the Delphic grant to the Aetolians in the very circumstances of the year 335<sup>21</sup>. He argued that in “the first moments of uncertainty after the assassination of Philip” the Delphians tried to liberate themselves from the Macedonian protectorate and saw in Aetolia a potential ally. A trace of these Delphic hopes might have been — according to Arnush — the *promanteia* to the Confederacy. Yet, the Delphic polis concurrently, in the archonship of Sarpadon, voted honours for the Macedonian general, Polyperchon, son of Simmias. A restoration by Arnush in the text of a Delphic grant to this individual (previously SEG 17.230, now SEG 44.473)<sup>22</sup> seems correct. The date of Sarpadon remains, however, an open question. A scenario according to which the Delphians looked for an Aetolian alliance against

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δὲ τὴν Θεσσαλίαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς Λαμία καλούμενον πόλεμον οὐ φασὶν ἐκστρατεύσασθαι, οὐ γὰρ πω μετὰ τὸ πταῖσμα ἀνενηνοχῆναι τὸ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς (“And later, when the league of the Greeks fought the War of Chaeronea against Philip II and the Macedonians, the Achaeans took their part, but they did not march to Thessaly and the so-called Lamian War, since they had not yet recovered from the defeat in Boeotia”).

<sup>19</sup> One of the best specialists estimates that the Achaean hoplites at Chaeronea were 2000, Hammond, *Philip of Macedon* (n. 7) 148. According to Hammond “The Achaeans too who were evidently next to the Boeotians suffered heavy losses” (p. 155 with a reference to Pausanias 7, 6, 5–6). One can agree with it but, given that there was a need for the homeland’s defence, it would be extraordinary for the Achaeans to send their main forces outside the Peloponnese.

<sup>20</sup> J. Bousquet, *Les Aitoliens à Delphes au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, BCH 81 (1957) 484–495. The alternative for 330s as a period, in which Sarpadon hold his office, are years after 312 or 310. Cf. J. Bousquet, *Études sur les comptes de Delphes*, Athenes, Paris 1988, 74 n. 65.

<sup>21</sup> Arnush, *The Archonship of Sarpadon at Delphi* (n. 3) 95–104. That line of argument was reaffirmed (and reinforced) in M. Arnush, *Argead and Aetolian Relations with the Delphic Polis in the Late Fourth Century B.C.*, in: R. Brock, S. Hodkinson (eds.), *Alternatives to Athens. Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece*, Oxford 2000, 293–307; where the beginning of Aetolian-Macedonian rivalry for control over Delphi was vividly depicted. It is true that conclusions of Arnush are based on opinion of Bousquet, *Études sur les comptes* (n. 20) 58 n. 50; 74 n. 65, that Sarpadon’s year in office could not be 338/7. Bousquet, however, does not propose any positive date for Sarpadon, and with some hesitation places Ornichidas in 335/4.

<sup>22</sup> Arnush, *The Archonship of Sarpadon* (n. 3) 95.

Macedonia is hardly possible. Its improbability appears clear, when we consider how easily the warlike Aetolians resigned from their Theban alliance. Given that both texts date from the same year, one can assume that they reflect a period, in which Macedon and Aetolia remained on friendly relations. Such links surely bound Aetolia and Macedon after the sack of Naupactus in 338<sup>23</sup>. The second possible (for me, even more plausible) date for the archonship of Sarpadon (i.e. a time after ca. 312) is rejected for epigraphical reasons. Stonemasonry of inscriptions from the year of Sarpadon is — according to most students — rather earlier. Yet, given their hesitation in dating the monument, epigraphical criteria could be misleading. A low date for Sarpadon is even more probable, when we take into consideration that Polyperchon and the Confederacy concluded in 310/9 an alliance that foresaw, too, territorial concessions for the Aetolians (Diod. 20, 20, 3)<sup>24</sup>. These concessions were re-affirmed in a one-year later treaty between Cassander and Polyperchon (Diod. 20, 28, 2). After concluding the treaty Polyperchon spent a winter in Western Locris (Diod. 20, 28, 4), a part of which had been already subjected to the Aetolians. Both Delphic privileges (so SEG 17.228 as SEG 44.473) may well have dated from that time of short *equilibrium* in Central Greece. Hence, it seems clear that the highly acceptable restoration by Arnush in the text of SEG 44.473 need not reinforce Bosworth's reconstruction.

Similarly, his construct does not find sufficient support in a mention (note 93 in Bosworth's *dossier*) of an Aetolian resistance to Philip II in Iustinus' *Abridgement of Philip's History* by Pompeius Trogus (28, 2, 11–12: *Aetolos autem principes Graeciae semper fuisse et sicut dignitate, ita et virtute ceteris praestitisse, solos denique esse, qui Macedonas imperio terrarum semper florentes contempserint, qui Philippum regem non timuerint, qui Alexandri magni post Persas Indosque devictos, cum omnes nomen eius horrerent, edicta spreverint*). Although it is nowadays obvious that a relevant passage of Iustinus covering the first (and dishonestly failed) Roman intervention in Greece ca. 250 is not an invention of ancient historiography<sup>25</sup>, nothing suggests that the speech reported by Iustinus/Trogus alludes to a humiliation of the Aetolians from Philip's hands as postulated by Bosworth. It is unbelievable that in such a boastful speech an Aetolian *rhetor* would have referred to a time when the Aetolian power had been nearly diminished by Philip II. More likely, he touched on a much luckier

<sup>23</sup> Given that all our information portrays Polyperchon as a man without scruples, he might have appeared ideal as Philip's willing executioner in Naupactus. For that, however, we can never find proofs. The *dossier* of Polyperchon is available in H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* II, München 1926, 325–326, no. 654; T. Lenschau, *Polyperchon*, RE 21, 2 (1952) 1798–1806; W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire*, London, New York 1992, 188–204.

<sup>24</sup> See Mendels, *Aetolia 331–301 B.C.* (n. 3) 176.

<sup>25</sup> For the authenticity of the story see the convincing argument *apud* Th. Corsten, *Der Hilferuf des Akarnanischen Bundes an Rom. Zum Beginn des römischen Eingreifens in Griechenland*, ZPE 94 (1992) 195–210 (with a well presented *status questionis*), cf. too: H.-D. Richter, *Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Historiographie. Die Vorlagen des Pompeius Trogus für die Darstellung der nachalexandrinischen hellenistischen Geschichte (Iust. 13–40)*, Frankfurt, Bern, New York, Paris 1987, 135–138 (with a detailed presentation of earlier studies).

and unpunished split of the Aetolians from Philip II, possible in the last months of the king and — very likely — connected with an Aetolian extension in a different direction (to Acarnania?), a very unwelcome event for Philip. It was the sudden death of the monarch that saved the Aetolians from a Macedonian interference. Thus, the Aetolians would have remained the only people in Greece, who never became dependent on Macedonia (cf. the quoted passage from Iustinus).

The proper understanding of the massacre in Naupactus is important for three — at least — fields of investigation: the history of the pre-Hellenistic Achaean Confederacy; the history and methods of Philip II and last but not least for the history of the Aetolian Confederacy. The examination of events has shown that first there was no reason and then not enough time for a compulsory disbandment of the Aetolian Confederacy at the demand of the Macedonian king.

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